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Defending the Indefensible to Further a Later
Case: Sanctioning Respondents in Illinois
Domestic Violence Cases
DAVID H. TAYLOR*

INTRODUCTION

When an act of domestic violence occurs in Illinois, as in most
other jurisdictions, both criminal charges and a civil Domestic Violence
Order of Protection may follow.' The order of protection may be
commenced in conjunction with a criminal charge or may be
commenced as an independent action. 1 Because of the exigencies of the
domestic violence situation, the legislature has enacted a statutory
scheme that expedites the civil proceeding, so that the civil order of
protection proceeding takes place in a period of twenty-one days from
initial filing to final hearing. 3 In other contexts, an act of intentional
injury could give rise to both a civil personal injury matter and a
criminal prosecution. But in these situations, it would be anticipated
that the criminal case would be resolved prior to the civil matter.
Therefore, the domestic violence situation is somewhat unique in that

Professor of Law and Director of Skills Training, Northern Illinois University
College of Law. I wish to acknowledge the hard work and very helpful research assistance
provided by Joan P. Altman. I also wish to thank Bernie Shapiro, Director of Litigation,
Prairie State Legal Services, for his helpful comments and insights on an earlier draft.
See generally, The Domestic Violence Act of 1986, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
I.
60/101-60/401 (2002). The precise criminal charge is dependent upon the nature of the act
of violence, possibly ranging from Domestic Battery, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2 (2002),
to Aggravated Domestic Battery, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.3 (2002). Murder of a
person who is the subject of an order of protection is an aggravating factor for First Degree
Murder, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(19) (2002), though a petition for an order of
protection would obviously not be filed in regard to abuse that resulted in death.
A petition for an order of protection can be commenced as an independent civil
2.
COMP. STAT. 60/202(a)(1) (2002), or in conjunction with a criminal action,
ILL.
750
action,
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/i 12A-2 (2002), and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/202(a)(3) (2002). In
either event, the action is considered a civil matter in which rules of civil procedure are
applicable, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/205 (2002), and 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/112A-6
(2002).
3. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (generally outlining the procedure
and timing of petitions and hearings involved in actions seeking an order of protection).
*
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the civil case proceeds prior to the resolution of the criminal matter.4
This creates an opportunity for the respondent to use the order of
protection proceeding for two improper purposes related to the defense
of a subsequent criminal charge. 5 First, during the civil proceeding, the
respondent may seek to use cross examination of the abuse victim for
purposes of intimidation so that she may wish not to be a witness in the
later criminal prosecution. 6 Second, the cross examination might be
conducted to gain the equivalent of a discovery deposition that would
not be available in the criminal matter.7 In this article, I will discuss
that when either or both occurs, the respondent should be subject to
sanctions pursuant to both Supreme Court Rule 1378 and the specific
sanction provision of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act. 9 The most
difficult question involved is how to draw the line between a legitimate
defense of the civil matter and a defense for either of the improper
purposes.' 0
In this article, I will seek to draw that line. I will first discuss that
separating legitimate defenses from improper defenses would be aided
by requiring respondents to file answers to petitions for orders of
protection. I will argue that such is required by applicable statute,
though not often required in practice. I will then address the Fifth
Amendment problem presented when a party facing concurrent civil and

4.
A similar situation can occur where a civil forfeiture proceedings is filed
against a defendant charged with drug possession with intent to sell, or with juvenile abuse
and neglect petitions where a criminal charge is also filed. In each, the civil matter will
come to hearing and resolution prior to the resolution of the criminal matter.
5. I have not gathered empirical data to support this hypothesis. It is based upon
anecdotal evidence from my experiences in the Zeke Giorgi Legal Clinic at the Northern
Illinois University College of Law as well as conversations with attorneys who represent
victims of domestic violence as well those practicing criminal defense.
6.
Throughout the article I have used the pronoun "she" in reference to victims of
domestic violence. There are, of course, male victims as well. Nevertheless, because abuse
of females by males is most prevalent, I have used the female pronouns.
7.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, § 20.2(d), at 838, § 20.2 n.64 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing that though the
deposition is a "major discovery device" in civil cases, its availability is "much more
restricted" in criminal cases and allowed in only ten states, not including Illinois).
8.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137.
9.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/226 (2002) (providing mandatory sanctions for untrue
allegations and denials made without reasonable cause).
10.
See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.1 cmt. (2002)
("These [Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.1 and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 11] seek to achieve a balance between effective curtailment of frivolous
and abusive claims without chilling the tenets of zealous advocacy...").
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criminal actions is required to answer the civil case before resolution of
the criminal matter. I will propose an amendment to the Illinois
Domestic Violence Act that prevents the pleadings or testimony from an
order of protection action from use in a subsequent criminal action. I
will argue that so doing aids both the petitioner and respondent, and
comports with the legislature's expressed intention to provide prompt
relief and protection to victims of domestic violence.''
I. PETITIONS FOR ORDERS OF PROTECTION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

An overview of the procedure for petitions for orders of protection
may be helpful in examining the question of sanctions for a respondent
who defends the action in order to gain discovery for use in a later
This
criminal charge or intimidate a potential adverse witness.
description is intended for those unfamiliar with the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act ("DVA").12 The reader who practices in this area may
wish to proceed to Part II.
A person protected by the DVA who has been abused may file a
petition to obtain an order of protection.' 3 Generally speaking, abuse
within the meaning of the DVA ranges from harassment to physical
abuse."4 If the court finds that the petitioner has been abused, a wide6
15
of abuse,'
range of remedies can be ordered, including: prohibition
exclusive possession of a shared residence,17 an order to stay away from
petitioner,18 an order to undergo counseling,' 9 temporary custody of
minor children,2 ° prohibition of concealment or removal of minor

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(4) (2002) (stating as one of the purposes of the
1I.
Domestic Violence Act, "[to] [slupport the efforts of victims of domestic violence to avoid
further abuse by promptly entering and diligently enforcing court orders which prohibit
abuse ....).
12.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/101 (2002).
Protected persons are delineated at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201 (2002) and
13.
further defined at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2002).
Abuse is defined at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(1) (2002), and further
14.
definitions of the terms utilized in the definition of abuse are found throughout Section 103.
Available remedies are set out at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b) (2002).
15.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(1) (2002).
16.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(2) (2002).
17.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(3) (2002).
18.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(4) (2002).
19.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(6) (2002).
20.
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children, 2' an order to appear in court with the children,22 possession of
personal property, 23 payment of support, 24 prohibition of entry into the
residence while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 25 and
prohibition of firearm possession.2 6
Many, if not most, petitions for an order of protection are
precipitated by an episode of recent abuse. 27 The petitioner customarily
desires immediate relief to prevent recurrence of the abusive behavior
and to keep the abuser away from the victim(s) and/or exclude the
abuser from a shared residence. Therefore, the DVA provides for the
issuance of an "emergency order of protection" which can be granted ex
parte and without notice.28 The emergency order is effective for up to
twenty-one days.29 If the respondent has been given notice of the
hearing, the court may enter an "interim order of protection" 30 that is
effective for up to thirty days.
Within the effective time period of the
emergency or interim order, and if service has been accomplished upon
the respondent, the petitioner will seek to have a hearing held on the
petition in order to obtain a "plenary order of protection.",32 A plenary
order of protection may be effective for a period up to two years.33
Therefore, an action seeking an order of protection is usually
commenced and brought to final hearing within a twenty-one day
period, except for any necessary enforcement actions.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

750 ILL. COMP.
750 ILL. COMP.
750 ILL. COMP.
750 ILL. COMP.
750 ILL. COMP.
750 ILL. COMP.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

60/214(b)(8) (2002).
60/214(b)(9) (2002).
60/214(b)(10) (2002).
60/214(b)(12) (2002).
60/214(b)(14) (2002).
60/214(b)(14.5) (2002).

27. The DVA does not appear to set a time frame within which abuse has occurred
in order for the abuse to meet the statutory definition. The definition of abuse does not
contain a time reference. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(a) (2002). The provision
delineating persons protected by the Act refers to "any person abused" without a temporal
component. Whether the abuse was recent or not could come into play in terms of what
remedies are available, but recent abuse does not seem to be a statutory prerequisite.
28.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217 (2002).
29.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/220(a)(1) (2002).
30.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/218(a) (2002).
31.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/220(a)(2) (2002).
32.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/219 (2002).
33. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/220(b) (2002).
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II. A COMPOUNDING CONFUSION: IS AN ANSWER REQUIRED?
At the heart of the matter, as previously mentioned, is a
determination of when a respondent is defending a petition for an order
of protection in good faith as opposed to when a respondent is
defending for an improper purpose. It is a difficult line to draw. A
significant contributing factor to drawing that line is that in Illinois, the
customary practice, in my experience, is that it is rare for respondents to
file an answer in response to the petition.34 Therefore, the respondent
appears on a return date and can contest the petition without having had
to admit or deny the factual allegations of the petition or indicating what
Therefore, without an
sought-after remedies they are contesting.
indication of the basis of the defense, it is much easier to defend for an
improper purpose because the purpose of the defense has not been
explicated and is simply not known. Additionally, of course, is the
problem that the applicable sanction provisions in both the Domestic
Violence Act 35 and Supreme Court Rules 36 are tied to signed documents.

Though having been involved directly or indirectly with a great number of
34.
cases as both the attorney of record or the faculty supervisor of a clinical course in domestic
abuse, I have not ever had a respondent file an answer. I have asked attorneys I know who
practice in the area and asked the question on an on-line discussion group. Generally
speaking, the responses were that answers are rarely filed, though they are not unheard of.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/226 (2002).
35.
Untrue statements. Allegations and denials, made without reasonable
cause and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to
the payment of reasonable expenses actually incurred by the other party
by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee, to be summarily taxed by the court upon motion made within 30
days of the judgment or dismissal, as provided in Supreme Court Rule
137. The Court may direct that a copy of an order entered under this
Section be provided to the State's Attorney so that he or she may
determine whether to prosecute for perjury. This Section shall not apply
to proceedings heard in Criminal Court or to criminal contempt of court
proceedings, whether heard in Civil or Criminal Court.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/226 (2002).
ILL. Sup. CT. R. 137.
36.
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other
paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 23

Without an answer, it is arguable whether either is applicable.37
Nevertheless, custom of practice is that answers are not routinely filed

in response to petitions for an order of protection, and when an answer
38

is not filed, petitioners do not seek to have respondent answer.
Subject to a few exceptions, it is the practice in Illinois for a
written response to follow the filing of a claim presented in writing.39
Most notable among the exceptions to the requirement for a written

other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.
All proceedings under this rule shall be brought within the civil action
in which the pleading, motion or other paper referred to has been filed,
and no violation or alleged violation of this rule shall give rise to a
separate civil suit, but shall be considered a claim within the same civil
action. Motions brought pursuant to this rule must be filed within 30
days of the entry of final judgment, or if a timely post-judgment motion
is filed, within 30 days of the ruling on the post-judgment motion.
This rule shall apply to the State of Illinois or any agency of the State
in the same manner as any other party. Furthermore, where the litigation
involves review of a determination of an administrative agency, the
court may include in its award for expenses an amount to compensate a
party for costs actually incurred by that party in contesting on the
administrative level an allegation or denial made by the State without
reasonable cause and found to be untrue.
Where a sanction is imposed under this rule, the judge shall set forth
with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either
in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137.
37.
But see Hernandez v. Williams, 632 N.E.2d 49, 52 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (finding
that in a small claims case where an answer is not required that an appearance and jury
demand served as a denial of the allegations of the complaint and hence subjected the
attorney to sanctions for denying the complaint without a well grounded basis in fact).
38.
See supra note 34.
39.
See JEFFREY A. PARNESS, ILLINOIS CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5-1 at 87 (1998) (stating,
"[w]hen claims are so presented [in writing] defending parties usually must respond to them
is some written fashion .... ).
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response are forcible detainer and small claims actions, each of which is
subject to specific rules for summons and answer. Inforcible detainer
actions, the summons requires an appearance in court at a specified time
court. 4 1
and date.4° No written answer is required unless ordered by the
Similarly, in small claims cases the defendant must appear on a
specified date at which time "the case shall be tried unless otherwise
ordered.'4 2 A written response is not required unless ordered by the
court.43 In all other cases not specifically provided for, a twofold
scheme applies, depending on whether the summons requires an
appearance within thirty days after service pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 181(a), or requires appearance on a specified day pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 181(b). If defendant is required to appear within
thirty days of service, the defendant must file an appearance and
respond to the complaint with a written motion or answer. 44 If the

ILL. SUP. CT. R. 181(2):
Forcible Detainer Actions. In actions for forcible detainer (see Rule
101(b)), the defendant must appear at the time and place specified in the
summons. If the defendant appears, he need not file an answer unless
ordered by the court; and when no answer is ordered, the allegations of
the complaint will be deemed denied, and any defense may be proved as
if it were specifically pleaded.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 181(2).
Id.
41.
42. ILL. SUp. CT.R. 286(a):
Unless the "Notice to Defendant" (see Rule 101(b)) provides otherwise,
the defendant in a small claim must appear at the time and place
specified in the summons and the case shall be tried on the day set for
appearance unless otherwise ordered. If the defendant appears, he need
not file an answer unless ordered to do so by the court; and when no
answer is ordered the allegations of the complaint will be considered
denied and any defense may be proved as if it were specifically pleaded.
ILL. Sup. CT.R. 286(a).
43. Id.
44. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 181(a):
When Summons Requires Appearance Within 30 Days After Service.
When the summons requires appearance within 30 days after service,
exclusive of the day of service (see Rule 101(d)), the 30-day period
shall be computed from the day the copy of the summons is left with the
person designated by law and not from the day a copy is mailed, in case
mailing is also required. The defendant may make his appearance by
filing a motion within the 30-day period, in which instance an answer or
another appropriate motion shall be filed within the time the court
directs in the order disposing of the motion. If the defendant's
appearance is made in some other manner, nevertheless his answer or

40.
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summons requires an appearance on a specified day, the defendant must
file a written appearance prior to, or appear in court on the day
specified. In either case, the defendant is allowed ten days after the
appearance date to file an answer or motion, unless otherwise directed
by the court. 45 Domestic violence actions seeking an order of protection
do not fit neatly into this scheme, and practice varies throughout the
state.
An action for an order of protection can be commenced as an
independent proceeding, 46 or in conjunction with a pending civil 4 7 or
criminal matter.4 8 In either event, including filing in conjunction with a
criminal charge, the action is treated as a civil matter in terms of what
procedures are applicable. The standard of proof is preponderance of
the evidence and the statute looks to civil matters for applicable rules of
procedure. 49 Whether filed as an independent action or in conjunction
with another matter, a petition for an order of protection is considered a
distinct cause of action requiring a separate summons. 50 Nevertheless, if
the action has been filed in conjunction with a civil case in which "the
defendant has filed a general appearance, a separate summons need not
issue", and notice may be provided in accordance with applicable

ILL. SUP.
45.

ILL. SUP.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

appropriate motion shall be filed on or before the last day on which he
was required to appear.
CT. R. 181 (a).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 181(b):
When Summons Requires Appearance on Specified Day. (I) Actions
for Money. Unless the "Notice to Defendant" (see Rule 101(b))
provides otherwise, an appearance in a civil action for money in which
the summons requires appearance on a specified day may be made by
appearing in person or by attorney at the time and place specified in the
summons and making the appearance known to the court, or before the
time specified for appearance by filing a written appearance, answer, or
motion, in person or by attorney. The written appearance, answer, or
motion shall state with particularity the address where service of notice
or papers may be made upon the party or attorney so appearing. When a
defendant appears in open court, the court shall require him to enter an
appearance in writing. When an appearance is made in writing
otherwise than by filing an answer or motion, the defendant shall be
allowed 10 days after the day for appearance within which to file an
answer or motion, unless the court, by rule or order, otherwise directs.
CT. R. 181 (b).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/202(a)(1) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/202(a)(2) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/202(a)(3) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/205 (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/210(a) (2002).
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Supreme Court Rules for service of papers other than summons, except
if an emergency order of protection is sought on an ex parte application,
5
in which case service of summons is then required. ' Whether notice is
accomplished by summons or other notice, the form of any required
answer or appearance is unclear.
If service of process is required, the summons is to be "in the form
prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 101(d), except that it shall require
52 What is not specified
respondent to answer or appear within 7 days.
is whether an appearance by itself will suffice, as in a small claim or
forcible detainer action,53 or whether a written answer must follow,
though Rule 101(d) references Supreme Court Rule 181(a), which
requires an answer or written motion within the number of days
specified in the summons.
54 For example, in
The practice in some circuits is in conformity.
Cook County and LaSalle County, the summons available from the
Circuit Clerks require an answer or appearance within seven days.
Nevertheless, a written answer does not necessarily follow. In other
an55
counties, such as Kane and Winnebago, the summons requires
in this case.,
complaint
the
answer
"to
date
specified
a
appearance on
Usually, however, that date is not within seven days of service as
specified in Section 60/210 of the Domestic Violence Act, but rather is
the date set for the hearing for a plenary order, sometime within twentyone days of the filing of the petition and the entry of an emergency ex
parte order. Though such practice would seem to most closely follow
that of Supreme Court Rule 181 (b), the rules require a written answer to
follow within ten days, unless otherwise ordered. As the date for
appearance is the date for the plenary hearing, an answer ten days hence
obviously cannot follow. Instead, courts and practitioners treat order of
protection cases more like forcible detainer or small claims actions
requiring a personal appearance at a specified date, but not requiring a

51.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/210.1(a) (2002).

52.

750

ILL. COMP. STAT.

60/210(a) (2002).

See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
53.
The Act provides that the office of the clerk of each court "shall provide ...
54.
simplified forms and clerical assistance" for the benefit of pro se petitioners. The available
forms are commonly utilized by practitioners, most often with the encouragement of the
court.
To add to the confusion, the Winnebago County summons does not even
55.
contain a date to answer or appear but instead refers to a date "as indicated on the petition."
But the form petition does not contain a space to insert a date. Rather it is contained on the
form order of protection.
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written answer. Those practices, though, are authorized by rule specific
to the type of action. A comparable provision for petitions for orders of
protection has not been made.
Consequently, in counties requiring an answer within seven days,
an answer is called for, but is not often required by courts or demanded
by petitioners. In counties requiring appearance on a specified date, an
answer is not required. Nevertheless, language in the DVA indicates
that a written answer is contemplated. Most significantly, the DVA
provides that in order for a plenary order to issue, the petitioner must
establish that a "general appearance was made or filed by the
respondent '56 and that the "[r]espondent has answered or is in
default. '' 57 Because a general appearance and answer are set out as two
separate and distinct requirements, it follows that an appearance on a
specified date as in forcible detainer and small claims actions does not
alone suffice. A written answer should also be required. 58 This
distinction between an answer and general appearance is contained
elsewhere in the DVA. For example, in regard to hearings for both
emergency and interim orders, the DVA uses language that refers to a
physical appearance in court after which a respondent "may elect to file
a general appearance and testify., 59 Thereafter, the DVA contemplates
an answer or a finding of default. 60
A written answer admitting or denying the allegations of the
petition would accomplish several purposes.
Applicable sanction
provisions are invoked by a signature on a written document. Without
an answer, there is no document and no signature. By admitting or
denying allegations, the specific factual issues in question are identified,
as well as the specific remedies that the respondent intends to contest. 6'
Consequently, an answer may make it an easier task to distinguish a
good faith defense from one that does not seek actual relief but rather is

56.
57.
58.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/219(3) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/219(4) (2002).
See 5 ILLINOIS CIVIL PROCEDURE FORMS 98:10 (2002) (containing a form

"Answer to Petition for Order of Protection").
59. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217(b) (2002); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/218(b)
(2002).
60.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/219(4) (2002) (providing that a plenary order of
protection shall issue if the requirements for the requested remedies are satisfied and the
"Respondent has answered or is in default").
61.
See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 136 (allowing a denial to all allegations contained in a
paragraph of an opposing party's pleading only when the pleader can in good faith deny all
the allegations in that paragraph) (emphasis added).

20031

DEFENDING THE INDEFENSIBLE

intended to serve as a discovery mechanism for use in a later trial on a
criminal charge or to intimidate the victim/witness through aggressive
cross examination. But, the specter of the criminal charge raises an
obvious problem. How can the respondent be made to admit or deny
allegations of abuse that are the basis of a criminal charge without
running afoul of the Fifth Amendment?
One other point deserves mention. In order for the answer to be
useful, it must be made in response to a well-stated complaint - factual
allegations set forth in separate numbered paragraphs, each limited to a
62
That is often not the practice in petitions for
separate allegation.
orders of protection. The form pleadings frequently utilized belie the
63
pleading requirements of the Civil Practice Act. Most contain a block
of several blank lines in which the pleader is to insert their factual
allegations. The result is often a narrative description of one or more
instances of abuse, resulting in multiple allegations pleaded in one long
paragraph. Practitioners would be well served by pleading the facts as
they would in any other case. Therefore, the respondent would be
64 It would then be clear
forced to admit or deny specific allegations.
6 5 For instance,
which, if any of the factual allegations are contested.
respondent may contest having engaged in any abusive behavior. Or,
respondent may not have any basis for denying that a physical
altercation took place and he may only be contesting having been the
first aggressor, or the severity of what took place, or the requested
remedies. An answer to a well-pleaded statement of facts set forth in
separate numbered paragraphs limited to separate allegations would go
far to clarify the basis of the defense. 66

62. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-603(b)
ILLINOIS CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5-4(b)(1) (1998).

(2002); see also

JEFFREY A. PARNESS,

Some courts by local rule direct that the form pleadings are to be utilized if
63.
"practicable". See, e.g., Rules of the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit
DuPage County, Rule 15.21 (providing that "[a]ctions arising under the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986 ...should, to the extent practicable, utilize the approved forms for
such actions) (citations omitted).
See generally PARNESS, supra note 62, at § 5-4(b)(1) (discussing the Illinois
64.
requirements for responsive pleadings).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-610(a) (2002) (requiring specific denial to "each
65.
allegation of the pleading to which it relates.").
The requirement of an answer would also pose a potential difficulty for pro se
66.
respondents. Presumably small claims practice dispenses with an answer in part to simplify
procedure in order to accommodate pro se litigants. But, as discussed, orders of protection
are not small claims actions and the general rules of pleadings are applicable.
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III. THE REQUIREMENT To ANSWER AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Requiring a respondent to answer a petition for a civil order of
protection stemming from an incident of violence that could also give
rise to a criminal charge raises a Fifth Amendment problem when the
civil matter precedes the criminal prosecution. 6 ' An allegation in the
petition that "Respondent struck petitioner on the right side of her face
with his fist," if admitted, could subject the respondent to criminal
liability. Therefore, the respondent may assert the Fifth Amendment
privilege where the respondent reasonably believes his answer could be
used in a later criminal prosecution. 68 This contrasts with a more typical
civil action where there is not a question of self-incrimination and the
respondent would have to admit or deny the allegation.
If not
specifically denied, the allegation is deemed admitted. 69 If denied when
obviously true, respondent may be subject to sanctions. 70 The fact that
admitting the allegation would subject the respondent to civil liability
does not provide a basis for avoiding an answer. 7'

67.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself ....
); ILL. CONST. art. I § 10 ("No person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself..."). See also McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (stating the privilege against self-incrimination is not
dependent upon the nature of the cause in which the testimony is sought or to be used "[it
applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to
criminal responsibility him who gives it.").
68.
See In re Sterling-Harris Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 1963) (noting
the Fifth Amendment applies to the pleading stage); People v. English, 201 N.E.2d 455, 457
(III. 1964) ("It is well established that the privilege against self incrimination protects
against disclosure of facts involving criminal liability and not against civil liability.")
(quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2253, 2254 (1961)); People v. Lucas, 243
N.E.2d 228, 231 (III. 1968) ("The privilege is not without qualification. 'It is confined to
real danger .... ') (quoting Heike v. United States 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913)); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-610(a) (2002) (providing that every answer "shall contain an
explicit
admission or denial of each allegation of the pleading to which it relates.").
69.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-610(b) (2002) (providing that every allegation not
explicitly denied is admitted).
70.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137 (providing for sanctions imposed upon an attorney who
has signed a pleading found not to be well grounded in fact); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/226
(2002) (providing that denials made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue "shall
subject the party pleading them to the payment of reasonable expenses .... ).
71.
See Nat'l Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 926-27 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[tlhe Fifth Amendment does not privilege from disclosure facts which simply would
tend to establish civil liability but does protect witnesses from being required to make
disclosures, otherwise compellable in the trial court's contempt power, which could
incriminate them in a later criminal prosecution.").
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In civil order of protection cases where a criminal prosecution might
follow, the respondent has the right not to incriminate himself by
admitting the allegation.72 However, a false or wrongful denial could
subject the respondent to sanction.73 Therefore, the respondent should
be able to plead the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination as his answer to the allegation. Nevertheless, so doing
creates a tension between several competing, but equally valid
concerns. 74 On one hand, the respondent's Fifth Amendment rights
should not be violated in order to expedite the petition for order of
protection. On the other hand, the order of protection proceeding
should not be prolonged and petitioner should not have to put on proof
and endure cross examination proving the incidence of abuse when it is
undeniable that abuse occurred. Balancing these two interests creates a
difficult dilemma.
It is clear that both the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution as applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Illinois Constitution, Article I, Section 10, allow
for invocation of the privilege against self incrimination in an answer to
a civil lawsuit if there follows a reasonable risk of criminal prosecution
as a result of the answer.7 5 The respondent must answer non-

See, e.g., id.; McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 40.
72.
See supra note 70.
73.
See, e.g., Bathalter, 705 F.2d at 932 ("Inevitably, in civil cases where related
74.
criminal charges are involved, tension will arise between plaintiffs' rights to a just and
timely adjudication and defendants' rights to refuse to answer under the Fifth Amendment
upon a reasonable fear of prosecution.").
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("The Fourteenth Amendment
75.
secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees
against federal infringement - the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such
silence."); Halpin v. Scotti, 112 N.E.2d 91,93 (Il1. 1953) (discussing that Article I, Section
10 of the Illinois Constitution, is not substantively different from the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and stating that the provisions may be "construed alike and
United States Supreme Court decisions construing the fifth amendment are authoritative in
construing the similar provision of [the Illinois] constitution."); Robert Heidt, The
Conjurer's Circle - The Fifth Amendment Privilegein Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1065
(1982) ("The privilege may be used in a great range of civil cases. It may be used
whenever information sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be discoverable provides even
a clue that might point a hypothetical government investigator toward evidence of criminal
conduct. . . . More obviously, the privilege may be used in civil actions where conduct
giving rise to civil liability also constitutes an element of a crime. Examples include divorce
actions involving adultery .... " (citations omitted)); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479, 486 (1951) (holding that the privilege protects not only answers which directly reveal
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incriminating allegations in the petition, but may assert the privilege in
response to each specific allegation that could cause self-incrimination
in a later criminal prosecution if answered.7 6
The dilemma is made more difficult by the fact that invoking the
privilege operates as a denial of the allegation in regard to which it is
invoked.77 Unlike criminal prosecutions where no adverse inferences
may be drawn from the assertion of the privilege,78 an adverse inference

criminal activity, but also those that might furnish a link in the chain of evidence necessary
to convict.). See generally ROBERT J. STEIGMANN, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL § 20:01
(1995) ("[I]n order for the privilege to be invoked, the answer sought need only relate to a
material circumstance or link in the chain of proof from which a crime may be inferred. It is
not necessary that the answer, unconnected with other testimony, should be sufficient to
convict."); People v. Conzo, 23 N.E.2d 210, 215 (i1. App. Ct. 1939) (discussing the
privilege in a historical perspective and referencing significant Illinois case law to that time
regarding application of the privilege).
76.
See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (1951) (holding that the privilege must be
asserted with respect to particular questions, and in each instance, the court must determine
the propriety of the refusal to testify); Gabriel v. Columbia Nat'l Bank of Chi., 592 N.E.2d
556, 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination "must be
made as to specific allegations in the complaint so the trial court may ascertain whether the
privilege has been properly invoked.") (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. Stefanou, 831 F.2d. 484,
486 (4th Cir. 1987) which stated "proper invocation of the privilege [does not] mean that a
defendant is excused from the requirement to file a responsive pleading; he is obliged to
answer those allegations that he can and to make a specific claim of the privilege as to the
rest.") (citing 5 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1280, at 360 (1969).
77.
See Bathalter,705 F.2d at 929 (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d), providing "that
averments in a complaint are admitted when not denied," but that a "defendant's right
against self-incrimination would be considerably watered down if failure to explicitly deny
averments might result in summary judgment against him.") (holding that a defendant's
claims of privilege in an answer to allegations in a complaint will be treated as specific
denials):
[W]hen there has been a proper invocation of the privilege, the
Constitution prevents a federal court from imposing any sanction that
has the effect of forcing the person invoking the privilege to answer....
[Tlhe court must treat defendant's claim of the privilege as equivalent to
a specific denial. This has the dual effect of creating an implied
qualification to the language of the first sentence in Rule 8(d) and
putting the plaintiff to his proof of the matter covered by the 'denial'.
Id. at 929 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1280, at 360-61 (1969)); Gabriel,592 N.E.2d at 562 (finding the Seventh
Circuit's ruling in Bathalterdispositive and noting similarities in the language of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REV. STAT. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-610 (current version at 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-610 (2002)) covering pleading requirements and FED. R. CIV. P. 8,
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 and the U.S. CONST. amend. V).

78.
See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 US. 609, 613-14 (1965) (stating the court
may not "solemnize[]" the silence of an accused into evidence against him by allowing an
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may be drawn in a civil action,7 9 but at the pleading stage, the inference
8°
is not sufficient in and of itself to support a judgment for petitioner.
Therefore, because the assertion of the Fifth Amendment operates as a
denial the petitioner would still have to prove the allegations of abuse.
Additionally, in order for petitioner to benefit from any adverse
inference that can be drawn from the assertion of the privilege, the
petitioner must put on other proof. 8' In most circumstances this would

require petitioner's testimony, which obviously subjects her to cross
examination. It is through this cross examination that respondent would

inference from the failure to testify) (holding the Fifth Amendment prohibits comments on a
defendant's silence during a criminal proceeding).
People v. $1,124,905 United States Currency, 685 N.E.2d 1370, 1379 (I11.
79.
1997) (holding the "Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties in
civil actions when they refuse to testify .... ) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
318 (1976) and quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 439 (1961), the Amendment "does
not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a Civil Cause");
Schaffner v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 541 N.E.2d 643, 652 (Il. 1989) (stating the decision
whether to use the instruction or permit the opponent to argue for adverse inference is
reserved to the discretion of the court); Cf Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 22/316(g) (2002) (providing the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference
when a party called to testify at a civil hearing in accordance with the act refuses to testify
by invoking the Fifth Amendment); ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 2D, No. 5.01,
(permitting ajury to draw an adverse inference when parties fail to produce evidence within
their control at trial).
See Gabriel, 592 N.E.2d at 562 (holding it is a violation of the Illinois
80.
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to grant judgment on the pleadings based
on a defendant's invocation of the privilege in answer to allegations contained in the
complaint) (citing Bathalter, 705 F.2d at 930 (adverse inference is not available at the
pleading stage)).
See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977) (A party cannot be
81.
found liable solely because of reliance on the Fifth Amendment as this would constitute a
penalty tied to the exercise of the privilege; therefore, it follows that adverse inference
cannot be drawn from silence alone and must be considered as one of several factors.). See
also LaSalle Bank v. Sebugan, 54 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[d]eeming an allegation
of a complaint to be admitted based on the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
without requiring the complainant to produce evidence in support of its allegations would
impose too great a cost and exceed the authorization of Baxter."); Doe v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d
1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that adverse inference is permissible only where
independent evidence exists to corroborate the fact under inquiry; silence in response to an
inquiry, in and of itself, is not sufficient to allow an adverse inference); Bathalter, 705 F.2d
at 932 (stating "in a civil case ... a judgment cannot rest solely upon a privileged refusal to
admit or deny at the pleading stage.") (holding "defendant's claim of privilege should not
have been deemed an admission, and that plaintiff should have been put to its proof, either
by way of evidentiary support for a motion for summary judgment or at trial."); Letourneau
v. Dep't of Registration & Educ., 571 N.E.2d 783, 790 (III. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that a
defendant's refusal to testify can lead to an adverse inference only in conjunction with other
evidence) (citing Giampa v. 111. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 411 N.E.2d 1110 (111. App. Ct. 1980)).
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be able to both gain discovery otherwise unavailable in the later
criminal prosecution, and attempt to use cross examination to intimidate
and harass the petitioner.
As discussed, respondents should be required to file an answer in
civil actions seeking an order of protection.82 Nevertheless, it would
seem that an answer alone does little to expose a defense for an
improper purpose. While an answer would ordinarily indicate what
facts are contested, the assertion of the privilege leaves the allegations
of abuse neither admitted nor denied, and leaves the petitioner having to
prove what is in actuality not subject to legitimate contest, but what
cannot be admitted without the respondent's self incrimination.
The respondent is also placed in a difficult position when the civil
order of protection proceeding occurs prior to a criminal prosecution.
Though the respondent may respond to the petition with assertions of
privilege, he will have a difficult time defending himself at any hearing
without risk of self-incrimination or waiver of privilege.
If the
respondent seeks to testify to defend himself, the privilege will be
waived. 83 Though he may refuse to testify at the later criminal trial, his
testimony at the prior order of protection hearing would be admissible
against him. 84 While in some circumstances a waiver of the privilege
may be limited to a particular issue, the issues in an order of protection
largely overlap. 85 The issues of abuse would be those which are

82.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
83.
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (stating in order to have the
benefit of the privilege it must be claimed or asserted otherwise the privilege is waived.
"The [Fifth] [A]mendment speaks of compulsion. It does not preclude a witness from
testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he desires the
protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been
'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment."); People v. Nachowicz, 172 N.E.
812,
815 (I11.1930) (stating the privilege is deemed to be waived if a witness answers without
claiming the privilege).
84.
See People v. Lamb, 587 N.E.2d 61, 63 (III. App. Ct. 1992) ("A defendant who
waives his or her privilege against self-incrimination may reassert the privilege and refuse to
testify at a subsequent proceeding concerning the same matter. Defendant's reassertion of
the privilege does not render defendant's testimony in the former proceeding inadmissible in
the later proceeding, however.") (citation omitted); People v. Peterson, 439 N.E.2d 1103,
1107 (1982) ("The general rule is that an accused who elects to testify at a trial waives his
privilege against self-incrimination through the use of that testimony at a subsequent trial.")
(citing Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, (1968) (stating "the general evidentiary
rule that a defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in
later proceedings."). See generally STEIGMANN, supra note 75, at § 15:32; CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 131, 230-235, 239 (1954).

85.

See, e.g., People v. Williams, 185 N.E.2d 686, 687 (111.1962) (finding
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common to both the civil and criminal proceedings. But the order of
protection proceeding could also involve issues of child custody,
visitation and support, as well as exclusive possession of a shared
residence. The issues of abuse have relevance to those issues as well. 86
Therefore, a respondent could not assert the privilege as to issues of
abuse and still defend himself as to the other issues because the
circumstances of abuse permeate the other issues as well.87 The pro se
respondent perhaps is in a more precarious position. For he cannot be
expected to know to assert his privilege, and his attempts to represent
himself in the order of protection could result in a waiver of the
88
privilege.
Therefore, both petitioner and respondent would therefore benefit
from a mechanism that allowed the respondent to participate in the
order of protection proceeding without fear of self-incrimination. If
respondent could be made to answer, petitioner may be able to avoid
cross examination that is needless, if not conducted for an improper
purpose. If respondent could participate in his defense without fear of
self-incrimination, he may not be placed in the position of having to
choose between self-incrimination and testifying in regard to child

testimony of defendant who waived privilege to testify regarding a motion to suppress could
not be of effect on any issue other than the motion to suppress.) (citing CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, 276 (1954); 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (1961)).
86.
See 750 IL. CoMP. STAT. 5/602(7) (2002) (providing that "the occurrence of
ongoing abuse as defined by Section 103 of the Domestic Violence Act of 1986" shall be a
factor to be considered by the court in determining the custody according to the best interest
of the minor child); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(6) (2002) (providing that "physical
violence of threat of physical violence by the child's potential custodian" shall be
considered by the court in determining custody according to the best interest standard); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT.

60/214(b)(6) (2002) (providing that abuse of the minor child by the

respondent shall raise the rebuttable presumption that it is in the child's best interest to not
be in the custody of the respondent).
87.
See, e.g., Wirtz v. Wirtz, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(respondent in a domestic violence civil protection order hearing unsuccessfully argued for a
continuance because the decision whether to testify therein forced him choose between
protecting his parental rights and property interests and protecting his privilege against selfincrimination at the later criminal trial on domestic violence charges arising from the same
occurrence).
88.
Sandra Guerra, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Accommodating the Fifth
Amendment Privilege in Civil Forfeiture Cases, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 593 (1999)
(noting the need to invoke the Fifth Amendment is not self-evident as "[T]he Supreme
Court ...expressed special concern regarding the lack of counsel in civil cases involving
the Fifth Amendment issues because parties in such cases more than in others need guidance
in understanding their rights and the ramifications of their decisions.") (citing United States
v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970)).
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custody or visitation. Therefore, respondent is faced with a Hobson's
Choice, a choice without an alternative, because if he testifies he risks
self-incrimination; however, not testifying could result in loss of
custody or visitation. 89
In circumstances where concurrent civil and criminal cases are
pending or where a criminal charge is reasonably likely to follow the
civil action, the respondent may seek a stay of the civil proceeding in
order to avoid self-incrimination in defending the civil action. 9° The
Fifth Amendment, however, does not require that a stay be granted. 9'

89.
Cf. In re Daniel D., 562 S.E.2d 147, 151-53 (W.Va. 2002). An analogous
situation arises in cases regarding termination of parental rights where it appears the welfare
of the child is seriously threatened. A parent facing criminal charges may elect to protect
himself by not testifying in underlying abuse and neglect proceedings or participating in
court-ordered counseling. In doing so, the parent loses the opportunity for reunification with
the child and risks his silence will be an indication that he is not cooperating with the court
order. Other states grant immunity for testimony at dependency hearings in order to
encourage testimony that facilitates the goal of protecting the best interest of the child and
promotes reunification of the family. These states grant statutory use immunity for
testimony at dependency hearings that constitutes an admission to acts at issue in a criminal
case. See, e.g., In re Jessica B., 254 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In re S.A.V., 392
N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
90.
A stay is discussed in some detail because it is commonly used to accommodate
a Fifth Amendment privilege in concurrent criminal and civil proceedings where the civil
proceeding is subsequent to a criminal proceeding and there has been a criminal indictment.
See Jacksonville Sav. Bank v. Kovack, 762 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (I11.App. Ct. 2002) ("a stay
is not normally appropriate when a defendant has not been formally charged."). Other
means of accommodating the Fifth Amendment privilege include a protective order, or seal,
and immunity. Immunity is discussed infra at notes 97-100 and accompanying text. A
protective order is applied most often to depositions and presents potential problems for the
respondent who would waive his Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., ILL. SuP. CT. R.
201(c) (providing broad discretion to the court at any time to make a protective order "as
justice requires, denying, limiting, conditioning, or regulating discovery to prevent
unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or oppression."). But it is
not certain that a protective order will accomplish the purpose of preventing use of the
respondent's answer in a later criminal proceeding. See United States v. A Certain Parcel of
Land Moultonboro, 781 F. Supp. 830, 834 (D. N.H. 1992) (stating that a protective order, no
matter how broad, will not guarantee that evidence from civil discovery will not "'somehow
find its way into the government's hands for use in a ... criminal prosecution."') (citing
Andover Data Services v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989);
Heidt, supra note 75, at 1095 (stating "[n]o protective order could provide ... absolute
protection ... against direct or indirect use [of information in a subsequent proceeding]" and
a protective order that would prevent the plaintiff from using the defendant's response
would be illogical). Therefore, a case-by case determination of the need for a protective
order would be an inefficient use of the court's time since it would not necessarily protect
the respondent's answer and could hamper the petitioner's ability to pursue her complaint.
91.
Jacksonville Sav. Bank v. Kovack, 762 N.E.2d 1138, 1141-42 (111.App. Ct.
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Rather, the decision whether to grant the stay is committed to the
discretion of the trial court.92 Several factors are considered by courts
in determining whether to grant a stay. The factors include:
(1) the plaintiffs interest in an expeditious resolution of
the civil case and any prejudice to the plaintiff in not
proceeding; (2) the interests of and burdens on the
defendant, including the extent to which the defendant's
fifth amendment rights are implicated; (3) the convenience
to the court in managing its docket and efficiently using
judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons who are not
parties to the civil proceeding; and (5) the interests of the
public in the pending civil and criminal actions.93
When those factors are applied to orders of protection, it is apparent
that stays are especially inappropriate.
The petitioner has an
overwhelmingly compelling interest in obtaining relief from domestic
abuse and stabilizing her living situation. That interest should not be
deterred simply because the abuse was of a severity warranting criminal
charges. As noted by Justice Steigmann of the Fourth District Appellate
Court, "it would be perverse if plaintiffs who claim to be the victims of
criminal activity were relegated to receive slower justice than other
plaintiffs simply because the behavior they allege is egregious enough
to attract the attention of criminal authorities." 94 Though the Fifth
Amendment rights of the respondent are implicated, that is only one of
95
the factors to be considered and is not dispositive in and of itself.
Because Respondent is otherwise able to defend the action, though
having invoked the privilege to not testify, respondent's interests are not
without protection.
Therefore, petitioner's interest in promptly

2002) ("[T]he Constitution does not require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome
of criminal proceedings.") (citing Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324
(9th Cir. 1995). "[N]o direct [F]ifth [A]mendment violation results from a trial court's
refusal to stay civil proceedings." Kovak, 762 N.E.2d at 1142 (referencing International
Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 857 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
92.
Jacksonville Say. Bank, 762 N.E.2d at 1142 ("The decision whether to stay civil
proceedings lies within the trial court's discretion.").
93.
Id. at 1142.
94.
Id. at 1142.
95.
Id. at 1142 ("Whether a party's [F]ifth [A]mendment rights are implicated is a
significant factor for the trial court to consider in deciding whether to stay civil proceedings,
'but is only one consideration to be weighed against others'.") (quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1989).
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obtaining relief from further96 abuse outweighs respondent's interests,
and the stay should not issue.
As has been discussed, the situation of the order of protection is
somewhat unique in that both parties have an interest in respondent's
ability to respond to the petition and participate in the case. Petitioner
has an interest in having respondent admit or deny the allegations of
abuse in the complaint, so as to avoid needless presentation of evidence
and cross examination, as well as to be able to promptly obtain relief
from further abuse. Though respondent would have an interest in not
answering out of fear of self-incrimination, respondent's interest could
change after the pleading stage. Respondent could be in the position of
perhaps wanting to testify without fear of self-incrimination in order to
either contest whether the abuse occurred or to address the relationship
of the alleged abuse to a custody determination based upon the best
interest of the child.97
The interests of both parties could be
accommodated by giving use immunity to respondent's answer and
testimony in the order of protection. Therefore, respondent could be
made to answer, clarifying whether he admitted or denied the allegation
of abuse. He also could testify about the circumstances of abuse as they
relate to issues of custody and visitation without fear of self98
incrimination.
In Illinois, the power to confer immunity lies only with the
legislature. 99 Consequently, both petitioners and respondents would be
well served by legislative action granting immunity to respondents in
actions seeking an order of protection. Such has been done in other
states. For example, The Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act' °° provides at
subdivision 15, "Any testimony offered by a respondent in a hearing

96.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(4) (2002) (stating that "promptly" entering
orders preventing further abuse is an underlying purpose of the Act).
97.
See Guerra, supra note 88.
98.
Telephone interview with Sandy Clark, Associate Director, N.J. Coalition for
Battered Women (Jul. 17, 2003) (commenting that N.J. STAT. § 2C:25-29 providing
immunity for testimony in domestic violence temporary restraining order hearings was
implemented to avoid concerns about double jeopardy and to prevent respondents seeking to
delay civil proceedings until resolution of criminal proceedings and result of statute is that
most respondents answer complaints and testify).
99.
See People v. English, 201 N.E.2d 455, 460 (II1. 1964) ("We believe that the
removal of the privilege by a grant of immunity must be left to the legislature."); People v.
Sanchez, 546 N.E.2d 574, 579 (I1l.
1989) ("[a] trial court has no inherent power to grant
immunity; that power belongs to the State.").
100.
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2002).
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pursuant to this section is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding."'' °
Similarly, New Jersey provides that "testimony given by the plaintiff or
defendant in the domestic violence matter shall not be used in the
simultaneous or subsequent criminal proceeding against the
defendant."'' 0 2 The extension of the New Jersey provision to the
plaintiff as well as the defendant helps create a disincentive for the
defendant to needlessly cross examine the victim of abuse in order to
attempt to harass the victim or to obtain statements that could be used
for possible impeachment in the subsequent criminal prosecution.
Illinois should follow suit with a comparable provision. Though it
should include language clarifying several points. It should be made
clear that immunity also extends to Respondent's answer, and that use
of the answer or testimony for impeachment is also prohibited. Also, in
order to discourage subjecting petitioner to needless discovery,
especially depositions, such testimony should also be excluded from use
in later proceeding. I would therefore propose the following language
be added to the Domestic Violence Act:
Neither the pleadings filed by petitioner or respondent, nor
their testimony offered during discovery or at any hearing
held to obtain a domestic violence order of protection shall
be allowed to be used in a simultaneous or subsequent
criminal proceeding for any purpose, including
impeachment, provided that such testimony shall be
allowed in actions seeking to enforce an existing order of
protection, to punish the violation of an order of protection
or where such statements would be otherwise admissible
hearsay statements by an unavailable declarant.

IV. DEFENDING AN ACTION WHEN No RELIEF IS DESIRED:
AN IMPROPER PURPOSE?

The specter of sanctions is raised on two fronts when a respondent

101.
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(15) (2002). See also Steeves v. Campbell, 1994 Minn.
App. Lexis 154 (1994) (stating that the trial court was in error in advising the respondent
that his testimony in an order of protection hearing could be used against him in a
subsequent criminal trial).
102. N.J. STAT. § 2C:25-29 (2003).
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defends a petition for an order of protection for the purposes of
intimidating the petitioner/witness or using the cross-examination of
witnesses as a discovery tool for a corresponding criminal charge. First,
an unwarranted or dishonest denial of factual allegations raises the issue
of sanctions pursuant to both Supreme Court Rule 137 and Section 226
of the DVA. Second, when a respondent defends an action, not for the
purpose of obtaining relief in that action, but for purposes of
intimidation or obtaining discovery for a different action, the issue is
raised whether the defense is for an "improper purpose" within the
meaning of Rule 137. Both deserve discussion.
A. UNWARRANTED DENIALS

Though sanctions for a pleading found to not be well grounded in
fact are most frequently associated with allegations in an affirmative
pleading, most often plaintiff's complaint, an unwarranted denial in an
answer should also give rise to sanctions. 103 An answer that simply
denies that which is obviously true is no more well grounded in fact
than a complaint that makes allegations that are untrue. °4 Both are
equally frivolous and cause needless delay and expense to the opposing
party and the court. In the actuality of practice, actions seeking orders
of protection are often treated by courts and practitioners as if they are
in the nature of criminal prosecutions where a defendant can plead not
05
guilty and put the petitioner to her proof.1
But orders of protection are
civil matters without the prospect of imprisonment. Therefore, as in any

103.
See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE,
(3d ed. 2000) § 14(B)(I)(a) (discussing the "paucity of decisions analyzing the
sanctionability of responsive pleadings" but stating that "responsive pleadings are equally
subject to Rule II as all other pleadings"). See also GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE II
SANCTIONS,

CASE LAW AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

(2d ed. 1992) § 4.01[b][2][A]

(discussing the reluctance of some courts to impose sanctions for frivolous answers but
stating "Courts should be no less sparing of lawyers who file answers in violation of Rule II
than they are of lawyers who file complaints in violation of Rule I I.").
104.
See Hernandez v. Williams, 632 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1l1. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that
the sanction provisions of Rule 137 for pleading false or frivolous matters "apply not only to
plaintiffs but to defendants as well."); Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Anderson, 532 N.E.2d 595
(111.App. Ct. 1988) (sanctioning defendant and his attorney for denying an allegation in a
complaint that they should have known to be true).
105.
See Hernandez, 632 N.E.2d at 53 (III. App. Ct 1994) (stating that a defendant in
a civil action does not have a right to "'put the plaintiff to his proofs"' and sanctioning
defendant is proper for defending an action without a factual or legal basis).
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other civil action, it should be expected that admissions and denials
made in response to the petition, as well as defenses, are warranted by
the facts.'6 There should be no such concept of putting the petitionerto
her proof
In cases where it is clear that physical abuse occurred, a denial of
that fact would be an untrue statement and subject to sanction.'0 7 Of
course, a bit of art, if not care, would have to be taken in the manner
with which the allegations of physical abuse were pleaded in order to
make a denial unwarranted. An allegation that "respondent struck
petitioner on the right side of her face with his fist causing bruises"
should not be able to be denied when that did indeed occur and the
petitioner has clearly been bruised. But when the allegation is that
"respondent repeatedly and savagely struck petitioner on or about the
right side of her face with his fist causing bruises, pain and suffering,"
the use of descriptive adverbs "repeatedly and savagely" would allow
respondent to be able to deny that the physical abuse, which obviously8
0
occurred, met the level implied by the use of the adverbs.1
Nevertheless, for the denial to not be evasive, it would be more accurate
to plead as an answer that respondent "admits striking petitioner, but
denies striking petitioner repeatedly or savagely."' 9 Additionally, the

106.
See ILL. SuP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3. 1, (providing that a lawyer may not
defend a proceeding unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, and that only an
attorney for a defendant in a criminal proceeding or a civil litigant facing jail time may
defend the action in a manner that requires establishment of proof of every element).
107.
See JOSEPH, supra note 103, at § 14(B)(l)(a) (stating that "[i]f a denial .. .is
asserted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the presenter is subject to sanction...").
108.
See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistenceof Pleading Practice,76 Tex.
L. Rev 1749, 1768 n.139 (1998) (stating that it is strategically wrong to use adjectives and
adverbs in pleadings because "[a]nonargumentative and simple paragraph within a
complaint may very well elicit an admission in the answer, thereby conclusively
establishing the facts alleged in that particular paragraph") (quoting Michael J.Fox,
Planningand Conducting a Discovery Program, LITIG., Summer 1981, at 13-14). See also
Matthew R. Henderson, Making The Most of Rule 216 Requests to Admit, 83 ILL. BAR J.425
(1995) (discussing that the use of adverbs and adjectives in a request to admit can give the
answerer an opportunity to respond with an evasive response rather than a simple yes or no)
(citing Theodore Blumoff, Margaret Johns, & Edward Imwinkelried, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
359 (1994).
109.
735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/2-620(c) (2002). Denials must not be evasive, but must
fairly answer the substance of the allegation denied. See also PARNESS, supra note 39, at §
5-4(b)(1) (discussing that "a responsive pleader cannot deny an entire statement within an
affirmative pleading that contains many factual allegations simply because one of the
allegations is false" and that "a specific denial should be made for each component of the
statement within the affirmative pleading that is denied, with the remaining components
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allegation of pain and suffering would arguably be outside of the
knowledge of respondent.
Therefore, a response of insufficient
knowledge to form a belief would be warranted pursuant to Section 2610(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure." 0 An affidavit of the truth of the
lack of knowledge is to be attached to the answer."' But, the denial of
an allegation that is unquestionably true and within the knowledge of
respondent should be subject to sanctions.
Actions seeking an order of protection are subject to two separate
sanction provisions, each of which contains a different standard for
sanction. Supreme Court Rule 137, generally applicable to all civil
actions, provides that the court "may impose" sanctions when a denial is
not "well grounded in fact" to the "best ...knowledge, information and
belief" of the person who signed the answer "formed after reasonable
inquiry."" 2 Section 226 of the DVA provides for sanction for
"allegation and denials, made without reasonable cause and found to be
untrue." The language is mandatory - "shall subject the party" as
opposed to the permissive language of Rule 137 - "the court ... may
impose."' 13 Though the two provisions are separate and distinct,
Section 226 appears to not be utilized. I could not find any reported
decisions in which sanctions were sought thereunder. In the one
reported decision imposing sanctions in an order of protection case for
reasons that would also invoke Section 226, Rule 137 was relied upon
exclusively. 114 What is interesting, is that the trial court denied
sanctions sought, in part, for allegedly unfounded factual allegations

admitted").
110.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-610(b) (2002) (stating that every allegation not
explicitly denied is considered to be admitted "unless the party states in his or her pleading
that he or she has no knowledge thereof sufficient to form a belief, and attaches an affidavit
of the truth of the statement of want of knowledge..
111. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-610(b) (2002).
112.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cheger, 571 N.E.2d 1135,
1142 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (awarding attorney's fees in a divorce as both a statutory award of
fees pursuant to Section 508(a)(1) of Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/508(a)(1) (2002), and as a sanction pursuant to Rule 137 for false denial in
answer of allegations of adultery).
113.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/226 (2002). See George Timberlake & Nancy Pionk,
Attorney Sanctions in Illinois Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137, 20 LoY. U. C. L. J.
1027, 1030 (1989) (discussing the discretionary, rather than mandatory, nature of sanctions
under Rule 137).
114.
See, e.g., Rankin ex rel. Heidelbaugh v. Heidelbaugh, 747 N.E.2d 483 (111.
App.
Ct. 2001) (finding it to be an abuse of discretion to deny sanctions against attorney for filing
an unfounded emergency order of protection sought by developmentally disabled adult
against his adoptive parents).
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found to be at least totally lacking in supportive evidence, if not just
untrue.1 5 The reviewing court found the denial of sanctions to be an
abuse of discretion. 116 If the mandatory language of Section 226 were
taken on its face, the trial court would not have had the discretion to
deny sanction thereunder, as the court does with sanctions sought
pursuant to Rule 137."17 Consequently, the imposition of sanctions
would have been mandatory.
Section 226 is somewhat unique in terms of Illinois procedure in
that it is a special sanction standard that applies to a specific body of
law. I am not aware of, nor could I find a comparable sanction
provision applicable to a different substantive area. Neither could my
colleague, Professor Jeffrey Parness, author of Illinois Civil
Procedure.18 As Professor Parness points out in his book, "[o]ften a
special pleading requirement is accompanied by a special sanction
standard."'" 9 For example, Section 2-622 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that the plaintiff attach an affidavit to the complaint
stating that the affiant has reviewed the facts and consulted with a
knowledgeable health care professional. 20 Untrue allegations in the
Section
affidavit "shall subject the party pleading them" to sanctions.
226 of the DVA, however, is not applicable to any special pleading
requirement. It appears to exist only because of the nature of
the action,
22
mechanism.
procedural
a
of
purposes
the
and not to further

115.
Id. at 447.
116.
Id.
117.
See, e.g., id. at 454 (discussing "that a trial court has discretion in determining
whether sanctions should be applied.").
118.
Conversation with Professor Jeffrey A. Parness, Northern Illinois University
College of Law.
119.
PARNESS, supra note 39, at § 14-2(a), at 308.

120.

735

ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/2-622 (2002).

121.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622(e) (2002).
122.
Petitions for orders of protection are sometimes subject to criticism when they
are used to gain advantage in an expected divorce proceeding. One party will file a petition
with questionable allegations seeking exclusive possession of the marital residence and
temporary custody of the children. Having the children in their custody and in response to
an allegation of domestic violence is viewed as giving such party a strategic advantage in
later proceedings. Section 226 and its mandatory imposition of sanctions could be viewed
as a deterrent to such abuse of order of protections proceedings, as has been incorporated
into statutes in other states, but there is nothing to indicate that was the intention of the
drafters.
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B. IMPROPER PURPOSE

Defending an action seeking an order of protection for purposes of
intimidating a petitioner/witness who will be called to testify against the
respondent in a later criminal prosecution or for the purpose of
obtaining discovery for that action raises the question of whether the
defense is for an "improper purpose" within the meaning of Rule 137.
There are two contexts in which this can arise. In one, as discussed
above, the respondent has made unwarranted denials to the petition,
subjecting himself to sanctions for asserting denials that are both not
well-grounded in fact and asserted for an improper purpose. 23 In the
second, the respondent may have a legitimate basis for denying factual
allegations in the petition and/or have good faith contentions as to the
relief sought. Though the defense may be meritorious, it may still
subject the respondent to sanctions if brought for an improper
purpose. 124
Rule 137, tracking the language of the 1983 version of Rule 11,125
provides that the signature of an attorney or party that is required on
"every pleading, motion, and other paper" constitutes a certificate that
the document "is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation."'' 26 The list of "improper purposes" is not meant to be
exclusive, but rather is exemplary. 127 The basic notion is that it is an

123.
See Jerold S. Solovy, et al., Sanctions Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
I1, C842 ALI-ABA 97 at 162 (discussing that "[t]here is often an overlap between the
inquiry regarding whether a pleading is frivolous and whether it is filed for an improper
purpose," citing In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 1990) and In re Grantham Bros.,
922 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991)).
124.
See generally Solovy, supra note 123, at 159-63 (discussing "filing a wellfounded complaint for [an] improper purpose"); JOSEPH, supra note 103, at § 13(C), at 22123 (discussing sanctions for "ill-motivated meritorious positions.").
125.
Rule 137 became effective on August 1, 1989, and was identical to a
predecessor statutory provision, ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 110, para 2-611 (1987) but for three
exceptions, most notably making the imposition of sanctions discretionary rather than
mandatory. See Timberlake & Pionk, supra note 113, at 1027-28 (discussing the evolution
of sanction provisions in Illinois and the differences in various formulations). See also
PARNESS, supra note 39, at § 14-2(a) n.6 (discussing that Rule 137 was "modeled after the
1983 version of [Rule I f]).
126.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137.
127.
See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, I 11.11 [8][a],
(3d ed. 2002) (discussing the comparable language of Rule 11 and stating that the "list is not
inclusive. An attorney or party may be sanctioned for any improper purpose.").
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improper purpose to engage in litigation for a28 purpose other than
intending to obtain relief from the judicial action. 1
Whether a well-founded claim or defense can be considered to
have been brought for an improper purpose is a source of some
disagreement in the federal circuits. 29 Some circuits have flatly held
that if an action has merit, it cannot be said to have been brought for an
improper purpose. 30
These are sometimes referred to as mixed

128.
See JOSEPH, supra note 103, at § 13(B)(2) (stating that "[a]n improper purpose
is any purpose other than one to vindicate rights (substantive or procedural) or to put claims
of right to a proper test," and "[i]f a complaint is not filed to vindicate rights in court, its
purpose must be improper."). See also In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518-520 (4th Cir.
1990) (discussing whether an action was pursued for an improper purpose in terms of
whether a complaint was filed for purposes other than to vindicate rights and stating "[i]f a
complaint is not filed to vindicate rights in court, its purpose must be improper"); Cook v.
Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1036 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding the trial court's
imposition of sanctions and quoting with approval the statement of the Judge Schwartz that
sanctions were appropriate because the action had been filed, "'not to vindicate rights but to
multiply proceedings and to put defendants and the courts to needless efforts and expense,'
and with the purpose of 'vexing, harassing and impeding the defendants in the proper
performance of their duties under the law."'). But see JOSEPH, supra note 103, at §
13(B)(2), (stating, it is not an improper purpose "to put claims of right to a proper test.").
As discussed supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text, putting a party to their proof does
not have a proper place in civil litigation. As will be discussed infra, at notes 162-65 and
accompanying text, such also runs afoul of Rule 3.1 of the ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT,
and of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT.
129.
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 127, at T II.11 [8][d] (stating that "[c]ourts
disagree on the question of whether sanctions may be imposed for filing a well-founded
document for an improper purpose" and citing the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits as
holding such is not sanctionable, while the Seventh Circuit holds to the contrary); JOSEPH,
supra note 103, at § 13(C), at 221-23 (discussing that "[tihere is a slight split among the
Circuits as to whether sanctions may be imposed for the filing of a meritorious paper for an
improper purpose."); SoLovy, supra note 123, at 160-61 (discussing that "[c]ourts are split
over the question of whether a lawyer or party can be sanctioned for filing a well-founded
complaint for an improper purpose.").
130.
See, e.g., Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "a
non-frivolous complaint cannot be said to be filed for an improper purpose."); Jennings v.
Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 320 (5th Cir. 1989):
[t]he filing of a complaint that complies with the 'well grounded in fact
and warranted by existing law' prong of Rule 11 cannot, as a matter of
law, harass the defendant as Rule I I forbids, regardless of the plaintiffs
subjective intent, or so we have held. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v.
Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223-24 (5th Cir.1988). If
Jennings' original complaint passes the test of non-frivolousness, its
filing does not constitute harassment for Rule II purposes.
Jennings, 877 F.2d at 320; Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995)
(reversing imposition of sanctions on a non-frivolous complaint filed for the improper
purpose of "exerting pressure on defendants through the generation of adverse and
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purposes cases.' 3' But to simply hold that a facially meritorious claim
cannot be brought for an improper purpose ignores the obviously
conjunctive language that considers frivolousness and impropriety as
independent factors, each of which must be met. 32 Similarly, because
the requirements are separate and distinct,33 not every complaint that is
frivolous is filed for an improper purpose. 1
There are no Illinois cases directly on point, though one decision,
Dyer v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals,' 34 has mentioned the concept of
sanctioning a party for a meritorious claim brought for an improper
purpose. Therefore, because Illinois courts often look to federal court
precedent in deciding Rule 137 cases, the federal decisions are
instructive.1 35 The split in the circuits also turns, in part, upon the
question of whether a court should delve into the subjective intent of an
attorney or litigant in order to ascertain whether a filing was intended
for an improper purpose. So doing is said by critics to foster satellite
litigation.136 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that a
subjective inquiry is appropriate in order to ascertain whether an

economically disadvantageous publicity ....).
131.
See, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 103, § 13(B)(2) at 216.
132.
See JOSEPH, supra note 103, § 13(B)(2) at 216 (stating that "[t]here is no textual
support for a limitation of improper purpose analysis to frivolous, as opposed to nonfrivolous complaints" and that "[a] balanced reading of the Rule does not support [the
position that non-frivolous complaints are not subject to sanction for an improper
purpose]."). See also Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., 332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that nonfrivolousness and not filing for an improper purpose are separate
obligations, the violation of either of which warranted sanctions); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d
505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing whether a complaint has been filed "to vindicate rights
in court" is the key issue in assessing whether an action has been filed for an improper
purpose, and that "[i]f a complaint is not filed to vindicate rights in court, its purpose must
be improper. However, if a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, and also for some
other purpose, a court should not sanction counsel for an intention that the court does not
approve, so long as the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive
as to eliminate a proper purpose.").
133.
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 127, T I1.11 [8][e] (stating that, "the court may
not infer an improper purpose based merely on a finding that the legal claims or contentions
were frivolous.").
134.
534 N.E.2d 506 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989). See also Donald B. Hilliker & David F.
Wentzel, Coping in the 90's: The Demand on Illinois Litigators Under Supreme Court Rule
137, 80 ILL. B.J. 168, 172-73 (1992) (discussing that it is "unclear in Illinois whether a
lawyer or party can be sanctioned for filing a well-founded complaint for an improper
purpose" and stating "[tihe issue was raised but not decided in [Dyer]").
135.
PARNESS, supra note 39, at § 14-2(a) n.7.
136.
See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting
inquiry into the subjective intent of the presenter of a paper in order to "reduce the need for
satellite litigation when a district court is called upon to impose a rule 1I sanction.").
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improper purpose was the motivation for a filing. 137 Commentators
have correctly pointed out that the divergent views on this matter are
largely semantic, or simply misguided, as courts should be able to infer
an improper purpose from objective conduct. 38 Illinois commentators
are in agreement that meritorious litigation can be pursued for improper
purposes in violation of Rule 137.139
An improper purpose can most easily be inferred from successive
filings of repetitive actions or multiple motions and like tactics. 140
Inferring an improper purpose from the defense of an action, not to
mention a possibly meritorious defense, is much more subtle.
Nevertheless, courts have found an improper purpose when a party
pursues one action for the purpose of gaining some advantage in a
different action. For example, it has been held to be an improper
purpose: to commence a civil action for the purpose of intimidating
witnesses or gaining leverage and discovery for a related criminal
prosecution; 14 to file documents in a bankruptcy action for the purpose
of delaying a related foreclosure; 142 or to attempt to cause a judge to
recuse himself from a different proceeding.143 When the circumstances

137.
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987),
(holding that "[blecause Rule II has a subjective component as well, the district court must
find out why [plaintiff] pursued this litigation.").
138.
See JOSEPH, supra note 103, § 13(A)(1), at 213 ("This dispute is largely
semantic. When a court is called upon to determine whether the improper purpose clause
has been violated, the court can do so only by inferring the presenter's intent from his or her
objective behavior."); William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New FederalRule /1-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 195 (1985) ("In considering whether a paper was interposed
for an improper.purpose, the court need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent. The
record in the case and all of the surrounding circumstances should afford an adequate basis
for determining whether particular papers or proceedings [were interposed for an improper
purpose].").
139.
See, e.g., Hilliker & Wentzel, supra note 134, at 173 ("Given the plain language
of Rule 137, it would seem that even meritorious litigation, if pursued to harass or for other
improper reason, violates the lawyer's duty under Rule 137.").
140.
See JOSEPH, supra note 103, § 13(A)(1), at 213-14 (listing behaviors that
indicate an improper purpose).
141.
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 520 (4th Cir. 1990) (sanctioning counsel for
bringing a civil action to gain advantage in a subsequent criminal action); Davisson v.
Engelke, 1997 WL 585818 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (sanctioning plaintiff for commencing a
civil action to engage in discovery not allowed in a criminal case and to intimidate potential
witnesses in the criminal case).
142.
In re Weiss, Ill F.3d 1159, 1171 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding the finding ofan
improper purpose in filing documents in a bankruptcy court for the purpose of delaying a
collateral foreclosure action).
143.
Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding an improper purpose in
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make it apparent that respondent has defended an order of protection for
similar purposes, sanctions should follow no less than when a plaintiff
has commenced an action for such improper purposes. The heart of the
inquiry should be whether respondent defended the action for purposes
related to that action, or some other action. Using the defense of one
suit solely to benefit another suit burdens the petitioner and the court
with time and resources expended for a purpose unrelated to the suit at
hand. When a party does not seek to vindicate rights in the immediate
action, the purpose is improper.44
One of the difficulties in determining whether sanctions are
appropriate when a respondent defends a domestic violence order of
protection case is that the question of the existence and extent of the
alleged physical abuse is relevant for multiple purposes. A finding of
abuse is necessary for an order of protection to be issued. 45 In
situations where there is not an issue of whether the abuse occurred,
cross-examination of the victim concerning the nature and
circumstances of the abuse may also be relevant to a determination of
appropriate relief.146 Therefore, contesting the abuse in a situation
where there is no question that it took place does not necessarily
constitute an improper purpose within the meaning of Rule 137. But
when the respondent cross-examines petitioner and her witnesses, but
puts on no proof, does not testify and does not argue for or against any
remedies, it becomes apparent there is no relief sought through the

filing a civil rights action against the judge who presided over the plaintiff's divorce in order
to get the judge to recuse himself).
144.
See Cook v. Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Judge Schwartz from a predecessor action that an action is improper when brought "not to
vindicate rights but to multiply proceedings and to put defendants and the courts to needless
efforts and expense.").
145.
See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
146.
See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protectionfor
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801,
961-66 (1993) (discussing that in many states evidence of domestic violence is a factor in
determining the best interests of the child in making custody awards). See, e.g., 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(7) (2002) (providing that "the occurrence of ongoing abuse as
defined by Section 103 of the Domestic Violence Act of 1986" shall be a factor to be
considered by the court in determining the custody according to the best interest of the
minor child); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(6) (2002) (providing that "physical violence or
threat of physical violence by the child's potential custodian" shall be considered by the
court in determining custody according to the best interest standard); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60/214(b)(6) (2002) (providing that abuse of the minor child by the respondent shall raise
the rebuttable presumption that it is in the child's best interest to not be in the custody of the
respondent).
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defense and no basis for it. 147 Rather, it is interposed for use in the later
expected criminal prosecution, such as discovery or harassment of a
future adverse witness.
Sanctioning a party for filing a meritorious complaint for an
improper purpose has been the subject of the issuance of cautions by
commentators who fear a chilling of the pursuit of vindication of
substantive rights 148 or interference with constitutional guarantees. 149
Even greater caution should be exercised when considering sanctioning
a party or attorney for defending a suit brought against them.
Nevertheless, both federal courts and Illinois state courts have shown
the ability to exercise appropriate caution, and it remains that there are
defenses that are devoid of merit, as well as defenses pursued for
improper purposes. 150 When such occur, sanctions should be assessed,
just as they should when frivolous or harassing complaints are filed.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in In re Kunstler is instructive as to
how to draw the line between a defense of an action for an improper
purpose and a legitimate defense.' 5' Kunstler involved a civil rights
action brought against numerous governmental and law enforcement
officials in their individual and official capacities by persons facing

See Hernandez v. Williams, 632 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (sanctioning
147.
defendant's attorney in a small claims action for defending a case without factual basis and
finding an indication of no basis for the defense in the fact that defendant cross-examined
plaintiff's witnesses but put on no proof in defense).
148.
See JOSEPH, supra note 103, at § 13(C), at 219 (stating the courts should be
"circumspect" about imposing sanctions for a meritorious paper filed for an improper
purpose).
149.
See Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study In Politically Motivated
Suits, Rule 11, And the FirstAmendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing whether
sanctioning a plaintiff for filing a meritorious case for an improper purpose violated a First
Amendment of access to the courts).
150.
See, e.g., Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 282, 289-90
(4th Cir. 1987) (failing to find an abuse of discretion in not sanctioning a defendant for
dropping two defenses on the eve of trial after considerable expense by plaintiff in
conducting discovery in face of plaintiffs allegation that the defenses had been raised "to
deplete their resources and force them to abandon their suit."); Matich v. Gerdes, 550
N.E.2d 622, 630 (11. App. Ct. 1990) (refusing to find the trial court engaged in an abuse of
discretion in refusing to sanction a defendant who had denied liability in an answer and
interrogatory even though defendant and his counsel had a letter from his insurance carrier
indicating defendant had no defense because, in part, defendant had stipulated to facts that
established his liability).
151.
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990). Kunstler was recently cited with
approval by the Fifth Circuit and followed in Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332
F.3d 796, 807 (5th Cir. 2003) (ordering sanctions for two improper purposes in seeking a
writ to execute a judgment: to embarrass the opposing party and self-promotion).
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criminal charges.1 52 Plaintiffs sought expedited discovery, which was
resisted by defendants on the grounds that it was sought to gain
information concerning the criminal prosecution.153 A little over a
month after filing, plaintiffs sought voluntary dismissal of the civil
action. 54 Defendants sought Rule 11 sanctions which were granted by
the trial court for full fees and costs, as well as an additional sanction
for each baseless claim. 155 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with
the trial court that the civil action was commenced for improper
purposes because, "plaintiffs' counsel never intended to litigate [the
action] and that counsel filed it for publicity, to embarrass state and
county officials, to use as leverage in criminal proceedings, to obtain
discovery for use in criminal proceedings, and to intimidate those
involved in the prosecution."'' 56 The Court found that it was proper for
the trial court to infer improper purpose from viewing the
"circumstances surrounding the case, when viewed as a whole."' 157
Similarly, viewing the whole circumstances of the defense of an
order of protection may reveal when the defense was not conducted to
vindicate rights, but rather was for the improper purposes of
intimidating a witness or engaging in otherwise unobtainable discovery
for a related criminal case. Courts should consider several factors as
part of the whole circumstances. It is important to assess whether there
was any basis for denying allegations of abuse. Of course baseless
denials are in and of themselves subject to sanction, 58 but light is also
shed on whether the defense was conducted for an improper purpose.
This is especially the situation where a respondent has responded to
59
allegations in a petition with assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege.
A baseless course of action may indicate it was pursued for a purpose
that was other than to vindicate rights and, hence, improper.' 6 0 But
other circumstances must also be considered, as a baseless defense does

152.
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511.
153.
Id. at 511-512.
154.
Id.
155.
Id. at 512.
156.
Id. at 519.
157.
Id. at 520.
158.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
159.
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
160.
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 519 (4th Cir. 1990) ("If counsel willfully files a
baseless complaint, a court may properly infer that it was filed either for purposes of
harassment, or some purpose other than to vindicate rights through the judicial process.").
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not necessarily indicate an improper purpose.1 61 It should also be
Where
considered whether the respondent put forth any proof.
respondent has merely cross-examined adverse witnesses but put on no
witnesses of their own, it may be inferred that the cross-examination
was not for the purpose of vindicating rights, but rather to gather
otherwise unobtainable discovery for a corresponding criminal case. As
previously discussed, there should be no concept of putting a party to
their proof. Therefore, cross-examination by itself is suspect of being
an improper purpose. Additionally, courts should consider whether the
aggressiveness of the cross examination was inappropriate as that
indicates an attempt to intimidate or harass the witness. Finally, if the
above factors occur in the context of a pending criminal prosecution,
improper purpose may more likely be inferred from the circumstances.
C. RULE 3.1 OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

An attorney who defends an order of protection for the purposes of
trying to intimidate a future adverse witness in a subsequent criminal
prosecution or obtaining discovery that would otherwise not be
obtainable in a criminal prosecution is in violation of Rule 3.1 of the
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.162 Rule 3.1 prohibits an attorney
from defending a proceeding or controverting an issue unless there is a
non-frivolous basis for so doing. Rule 3.1 is identical to Rule 3.1 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The commentary to the
Model Rule explains that an action is frivolous if its purpose is to harass
a person, which should include intimidation of a witness, or if the
attorney is "unable to make a good faith argument on the merits of the
action taken."'' 63 Cross-examination of the petitioner for purposes of

See id. at 519 ("The existence of baseless allegations does not alone require a
161.
finding of improper purpose.").
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 3.1:
162.
Meritorious Claims and Contentions. A lawyer shall not bring or defend
a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A
lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a
proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be
established.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3. 1.

163.

ABA

ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT,

R. 3.1 cmt. (2002).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 23

discovery for another case and without later argument on the merits
would also be frivolous within the meaning of the rule.
Rule 3.1 contains an exception for criminal proceedings or other
proceedings with risk of incarceration in which a lawyer may require
proof of every element, thereby putting the party to its proof. But the
limited application of the exception clarifies that in civil actions there is
no such concept of putting a party to its proof. As previously discussed,
such would functionally negate the requirement of admissions and
denials to each factual allegation of a complaint. Simply put, both rules
of civil procedure and codes of professional conduct require a lawyer
representing a client to admit that which is true. Therefore, the practice
of cross-examination of a petitioner under the guise of testing her story
is neither procedurally nor ethically permissible.
Additionally, the commentary to Model Rule 3.1 makes clear that
procedural and ethical rules are intended to be merged together. It
states that "Rule 3.1 is best analyzed in tandem with Rule 11", which it
"parallels", and that the two rules "[were] conceptualized to address the
same concerns."'1 64 This makes perfect sense, for it would indeed be
odd to consider an attorney's actions to be ethically impermissible but
65
procedurally valid. 1
CONCLUSION
There is no reason why a petitioner in an action for an order of
protection should be subjected to abuse twice - the first time being that
which gave rise to the action, and the second time being a frivolous or
needless defense that subjects petitioner to cross-examination only for
the purpose of seeking to intimidate or gain discovery to gain advantage
in a later criminal prosecution of the respondent. Of course, care must
be exercised to make sure that respondents who are defending the order

164.
Id.
165.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Williams, 632 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Il. App. Ct. 1994)
(affirming the imposition of sanctions against attorneys who defended action to simply "put
the plaintiff to his proofs" and stating, "[flurther we note that Rule 137, just like Rule I I ...
'creates duties to one's adversary and to the legal system."' (citing Mars Steel
Corp. v.
Cont'l Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989)). See also First Fed. Sav. Bank of
Proviso v. Drovers Nat'l Bank of Chicago., 606 N.E.2d 1253, 1256-57 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992)
(finding that a frivolous appeal brought for an improper purpose was subject to sanction
under the courts inherent powers and in violation of the professional obligations of Rule

3.1).
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of protection in good faith are not sanctioned for so doing. But that care
should not be so cautiously exercised that frivolous and/or improper
purpose defenses escape sanction. Though the line between the two is
fine, nonetheless it can and should be drawn, as courts are called upon
to draw such lines with great frequency. Victims of domestic violence
are certainly worthy of the careful attention of the courts required to
distinguish the defensible from the indefensible and the proper from the
Additionally, the legislature should adopt a
improper purpose.
provision excluding testimony given in an order of protection from use
in a later criminal proceeding. This would greatly reduce the incentive
to defend a petition for an order of protection for an improper purpose.

